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JUDICIAL SUPERMAJORITIES AND
THE VALIDITY OF STATUTES:
HOW MAPP BECAME A FOURTH
AMENDMENT LANDMARK INSTEAD
OF A FIRST AMENDMENT FOOTNOTE
Jonathan L. Entin t

Mapp v. Ohio 1 is justifiably known as a landmark of constitutional criminal procedure. In that case, the United States Supreme
Court applied the Exclusionary Rule to the states: the prosecution
may not use evidence obtained through an unlawful search and seizure. As Justice Harlan complained in dissent and as other contributors to this symposium explain, that issue was peripheral to the arguments when the case was heard in the Supreme Court. 2 Dollree Mapp
did explicitly argue in the state courts that the police had violated her
Fourth Amendment rights when they forced their way into her home
and seized the evidence that provided the basis for her conviction
under the Ohio obscenity statute. 3 But even in the state courts, the
Fourth Amendment took a back seat to other contentions.
Mapp advanced two arguments relating to the obscenity statute~
On the facts, she claimed that she did not have possession or control
of the books and pictures as required by the statute. She contended
that those materials belonged to a roomer who had left before the end
of his lease and that she had simply packed them away until hereturned for his belongings. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this factbased defense. 4
Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.
367 u.s. 643 (1961).
See id. at 673 (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter & Whittaker, JJ., dissenting). See also
Dennis D. Dorin, Marshaling Mapp: Justice Tom Clark's Role in Mapp v. Ohio's Extension of
the Exclusionary Rule to State Searches and Seizures, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401 (2001);
Lewis Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on Race in America, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
471 (2001).
3
See State v. Mapp,166 N.E.2d 387,389 (Ohio 1960).
4
See id. (holding that Mapp had the obscene materials within her possession or under her
control within the meaning of the Ohio obscenity statute).
t
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Her other argument was that the obscenity statute was unconstitutional because it effectively criminalized simple possession of obscene materials and therefore was analogous to the law that was
struck down in Smith v. California. 5 This argument had more resonance with the Ohio Supreme Court: four justices endorsed Mapp's
position about the validity of the statute. 6 Unhappily for the defendant, that was not sufficient to prevail on her First Amendment defense. At the time, the Ohio Constitution contained the following provision:
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court without the concurrence of at least all but one of
the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the
court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void. 7
The court contained seven members, so four votes for invalidity
were not enough. 8 Accordingly, the obscenity law was adjudged constitutional by a three-to-four margin.
Mapp is not the only instance in which this supermajority requirement resulted in a minority judgment of constitutionality. This
article examines that unusual provision, which was adopted in 1912
and repealed in 1968. The Ohio restriction on judicial review is not
simply a footnote to Mapp, which alone might make it an appropriate
subject for inclusion in a retrospective discussion of a landmark case. 9
361 U.S. 147 (1959) (invalidating an obscenity law that did not require the defendant to
know the contents of the materials at issue).
6
See Mapp, 166 N.E.2d at 391 ("In the opinion of Judges Taft, Bell, Herbert and Peck,
the portion of Section 2905.34, Revised Code, upon which defendant's conviction was based, is
constitutionally invalid, and, for that reason, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed.").
7
OHIO CONST. art. IV,§ 2 (repealed 1968).
Two of the four justices who thought the obscenity statute violated the First Amendment also believed, as a matter of state constitutional law, that the unlawfully seized evidence
should have been suppressed. See Mapp, 166 N.E.2d at 391-94 (Herbert, J., joined by Bell, J.,
dissenting). The other two justices believed that Ohio precedent made clear that unlawfully
seized evidence was admissible. See id. at 389-90. The three justices who thought the obscenity
law comported with the First Amendment offered no explanation for their conclusion.
9
The contemporaneous commentary on Mapp either ignored the supermajority requirement or mentioned it only in passing. For commentary ignoring the requirement, see, e.g.,
Recent Case, 74 HARV. L. REV. 779 (1961); The Supreme Coun, 1960 Tenn: Leading Cases, 75
HARV. L. REv. 40, 152 (1961). For commentary mentioning the requirement only in passing,
see, e.g., Jack G. Day & Bernard A. Berkman, Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary Rule: A
Re-Examination in the Wake ofMapp v. Ohio, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 56, 57 n.4 (1961); Recent
Development, Wolf v. Colorado Overruled: Exclusionary Rule Extended to States, 23 OHIO ST.
L.J. 147, 147 n.3 (1962). See also Bruce L. Newman, Note, Constitutional Law-The Problem
With Obscenity, 11 W. REs. L. REV. 669, 677 (1960); Melvin H. Reifin, Editorial Note, The
Constitutionality of Obscenity Laws: U.S. and Ohio, 31 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 292 & n.51
(1962).
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It is significant for several other reasons that bear on major jurisprudential themes. For one thing, the Ohio provision inspired a few other
states to require supermajorities for their courts to invalidate legislation, and two of those provisions are still in effect. For another, critics
of the United States Supreme Court during the New Deal pointed to
Ohio's approach as one way to limit judicial activism. Finally, the
Ohio provision goes to the heart of debates over the role of courts and
legislatures in a democratic society, an argument that dates to the
American founding and promises never to end.
I. THE ADOPTION OF THE SUPERMAJORITY RUlE

Ohio's supermajority requirement for invalidating laws was proposed by a 1912 constitutional convention. The convention was held
pursuant to a provision under which Buckeye State voters decide
every twenty years whether to convene such a meeting. 10 Support for
holding a convention came from an improbable confluence of conservative business interests that wanted to change the tax system and
progressives trying to adopt the initiative and referendum as well as
other reforms. 11 The progressives were particularly upset with a series
of Ohio Supreme Court rulings that invalidated statutes authorizing
mechanics' liens, 12 providing for an eight-hour day for employees on
public works projects, 13 and regulating abusive bulk sales, 14 as well as
other decisions narrowly construing worker-protection statutes 15 and

10

See OHIO CONST. art. XVI, §3. This provision was included in the Ohio Constitution of
1851, which with its amendments remains in force. Originally the vote on holding a convention
was to occur every twenty years after 1851. The convention that proposed the superrnajority
requirement put forward another amendment, which the voters approved, that called for conducting the vote on holding a convention every twenty years after 1912. The electorate has
decided against holding another convention since 1912.
II
See HOYT LANDON WARNER, PROGRESSMSM IN OHIO 1897-1917, at 295-96 (1964);
Lloyd Luther Sponholtz, Progressivism in Microcosm: An Analysis of the Political Forces at
Work in the Ohio Constitutional Convention' of 1912, at 18-23 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with author).
12
See Palmer v. Tingle, 45 N.E. 313 (Ohio 1896).
13
See City of Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Constr. Co., 65 N.E. 885 (Ohio 1902). See
also In re Preston, 59 N.E. 101 (Ohio 1900) (striking down, on freedom of contract grounds, a
law requiring that mined coal be weighed in a manner that favored employees over employers).
14
See Williams & Thomas Co. v. Preslo, 95 N.E. 900 (Ohio 1911); Miller v. Crawford,
71 N.E. 631 (Ohio 1904). The legislature had responded to Miller v. Crawford by enacting a
new law that was designed to address the supreme court's objections, but the court held fast to
its position in Williams & Thomas.
15
See, e.g., Morris Coal Co. v. Donley. 76 N.E. 945 (Ohio 1906); Jacobs v. Fuller &
Hutsinpiller Co., 65 N.E. 617 (Ohio 1902). Jacobs was especially controversial because it
involved a claim by a 15-year-old who lost his right arm while assigned to a dangerous job in
violation of a child labor statute.
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invoking the fellow-servant rule, 16 contributory negligence, 17 and
assumption of the risk 18 against the claims of workers. 19 The cases
seemed entirely consistent with U.S. Supreme Court decisions like
Lochner v. New York, 20 which had fueled widespread opposition.
Building on that dissatisfaction, Theodore Roosevelt addressed the
convention on February 21, denouncing Lochner and other rulings
that struck down reform measures, 21 and proposing what he called the
"recall" of unpopular judicial decisions by the electorate. 22 About
three weeks later, on March 12, William Jennings Bryan supported a

16

See, e.g., Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Burtscher, 78 N.E. 1129 (Ohio 1906) (per
curiam); Cleveland, L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Shanower, 71 N.E. 279 (Ohio 1904); Kelly Island Lime
& Transp. Co. v. Pachuta, 69 N.E. 988 (Ohio 1904).
17
.
See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Archdeacon, 88 N.E. 125 (Ohio 1909); Davis v.
Turner, 68 N.E. 819 (Ohio 1903).
18
See, e.g., Lima Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Hicks, 84 N.E. 1129 (Ohio 1907) (per curiam);
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Johnston, 81 N.E. 155 (Ohio 1907); Davis v. Somers-Cambridge
Co., 79 N.E. 233 (Ohio 1906).
19
Other cases narrowed the scope of employer liability in workplace tort cases. See, e.g.,
Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. v. Frye, 88 N.E. 642 (Ohio 1909); New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v.
Ropp, 81 N.E. 748 (Ohio 1907); Northern Ohio Ry. Co. v. Rigby, 68 N.E. 1046 (Ohio 1903).
Another controversial ruling held that a railroad was not liable for the injuries suffered by children who played with their unattended turntables. See Wheeling & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Harvey,
83 N.E. 66 (Ohio 1907).
20
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating, on freedom of contract grounds, a law that limited the
working hours of bakers). See also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down
a law that forbade employers from prohibiting workers to join unions); The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) (invalidating a worker's compensation program for employees of
railroads and other common carriers). Compare Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (holding that a secondary boycott by a labor union violated the antitrust laws), with United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. I (1895) (holding that the antitrust laws did not apply to the Sugar
Trust, which controlled ninety-five percent of the market, because manufacturing was not subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause).
21
Roosevelt was particularly upset about a recent ruling that invalidated the worker's
compensation statute in his home state of New York. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94
N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911); GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 210,
212-14 (1994). The day after lves was handed down, 146 female employees were killed in the
Triangle Shirtwaist fire in New York City. See WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FuRY: POPULISTS,
PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 47 (1994). Roosevelt also denounced the rulings that struck down the federal income tax. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
22
See Address of Theodore Roosevelt, PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO 378, 384-86 (1912) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS]. Roosevelt's speech refined and amplified suggestions that he had been advancing more tentatively over the previous year and a half. See Ross, supra note 21, at 131-36. His
remarks stimulated a controversy that endured throughout the presidential election campaign
that year. See id. at 137-51. Only Colorado adopted his suggestion for the recall of judicial
decisions, see id. at 152, and the state supreme court invalidated the scheme. See People v.
Max, 198 P. 150 (Colo. 1921) (state constitutional claims); People v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
198 P. 146 (Colo. 1921) (federal constitutional claims).
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less drastic approach that would require a unanimous vote for a court
to invalidate a law?3
Even before Roosevelt and Bryan spoke, Cincinnati delegate
Hiram D. Peck on January 31 had introduced Proposal No. 184,
which contained among its provisions to streamline the state's judiciary the unanimity provision that Bryan had endorsed. 24 The proposal
was promptly referred to the Committee on Judiciary and Bill of
Rights, which Peck chaired. 25 As reported from the committee, Proposal No. 184 provided:
[N]o statute adopted by the general assembly shall be held
unconstitutional and void except by the concurrence of all the
judges of the supreme court. 26
This unanimity requirement was part of a larger package designed
to streamline what had become an antediluvian judicial structure.
Under the 1851 constitution as amended in 1883, the six-member
supreme court sat atop a pyramid of circuit courts and a bewildering
array of trial and specialized courts. This unwieldy arrangement led to
numerous difficulties. For example, the supreme court was nearly
three years behind on its docket. 27 This resulted partly from the
court's expansive appellate jurisdiction, which enabled litigants to
obtain review of circuit court judgments as a matter of right, 28 and
partly from its operating procedures: the tribunal ordinarily sat in
panels of three but had to reconsider en bane all cases in which the
panel was divided or in which the constitutionality of a federal or
state statute was questioned. 29 Peck's proposed solution was to redefine the court's appellate jurisdiction and assign most review of trial
courts to the newly named court of appeals, which replaced the circuit
courts. 30 The thrust of the changes was to promote the concept of
"one trial and one review." 31 At the same time, Proposal No. 184 left
23

See William J. Bryan, Address on the Subject of "The People's Law," PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 22, at 663, 669-70.
24
25

26

See id. at 143-44.
See id. at 146.
/d. at 1028.

27

See 1 A HISTORY OF THE COURTS AND LA WYERS OF OHIO !53 (Carrington T. Marshall
ed., 1934) [hereinafter MARSHALL].
28
Peck described the circuit courts, which reviewed decisions of the various trial courts,
as "only a sieve through which everyone goes to the supreme court." PROCEEDINGS, supra note
22, at 1026.
29
See I MARSHALL, supra note 27, at 223.
30
See id. at 154.
31
Francis J. Amer The Growth and Develop1nent of the Ohio Judicial System, in I
7
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one feature of the supreme court intact: despite widespread concern
about tie votes in a six-member tribunal, the size of the court was
unchanged in the original draft. Instead, the draft provided that an
equal division would result in the affrrmance of the judgment below. 32
The unanimity requirement consumed much of the five days of
debate when the Committee on Judiciary and Bill of Rights brought
the proposal to the floor. The issue was joined almost immediately
between those who believed that the Ohio Supreme Court had overstepped its bounds by striking down innovative laws designed to deal
with modern developments and those who viewed the judiciary as
simply doing its traditional job of assuring that statutes comported
with the state and federal constitutions.
Peck began on April 3 by conceding that the idea of unanimity
was controversial but complained: "There have been too many judgments that have been made by the [supreme] court which seem to the
people not well grounded, in view of existing circumstances, and
which operate as stumbling blocks to progress, upsetting statutes
which were desirable in themselves .... " 33 Delegate William Worthington, another Cincinnati lawyer, responded that the proposal was
"at war with the very theory of jurisprudence." 34 Delegate James W.
Halfhill, a lawyer from Lima, raised another objection that would be a
recurring theme of critics, that the requirement of a unanimous vote
would give too much power to a single justice: "Do you not think that
this is making too much of a certainty and too much of the dominance
of one man on the court?" 35 Peck shot back that the current situation,
under which the court could invalidate a law by a three-to-two vote,
already gave one person too much power. 36
The flavor of the arguments is revealed by the following exchange between two other lawyer delegates, Humphrey Jones of
Bloomingburg and D.F. Anderson of Youngstown, during the third
day of debate on April 9:

MARSHALL, supra note 27, at 181,207.
32
Peck explained that the drafters left the size of the court unchanged to deflect criticism
that "the lawyers were creating new offices for themselves to fill," a charge that contributed to
the defeat of recommendations by the previous constitutional convention in 1874.
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at I 027. He ex: pressed willingness to accept a seven-member high
court if the delegates preferred an odd number, though. See id.
33
ld. at 1028.
34
Id. at 1048. Both Peck and Worthington were judges. See WARNER, supra note II, at
312.
35
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1029.
36
See id.
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Mr. JONES: Suppose you have a case in the common
pleas court where the common pleas judge holds the law unconstitutional, and the court of appeals also holds it unconstitutional. Now you go to the supreme court of six judges, and
five of them declare it unconstitutional. Do you think it the
right thing to let that one man in the supreme court defeat the
judgment of the five members of the supreme court, the three
circuit judges [of the court of appeals], and the common pleas
judge?
Mr. ANDERSON: You didn't start back far enough.
Where did the act come from?
Mr. JONES: Do you think it right to let one member of
the supreme court, by his individual judgment, defeat the
judgment of the other nine judges that the law was unconstitutional?
Mr. ANDERSON: You didn't start back far enough. In
the first place, take the house of representatives. We presume
there are a number of lawyers elected to the house, and we
presume they are moderately well posted in the law .... It
may be a violent presumption, but we will presume for the
sake of argument that they are, and those lawyers give their
best efforts to framing the law. Then from the house of representatives the act goes to the senate, and we will presume the
senate has a like proportion of lawyers, who give their best
attention to the consideration of the proposed law. And the
house and senate pass it and then it goes to the governor . . .
and then we will presume that the governor, after careful consideration, does not veto it but approves it, and of course if
there is any question concerning the constitutionality of the
law he will ask the advice of his attorney general. 37
Jones and other critics worried that an obstinate, willful, or corrupt judge would vote to uphold improper laws, whereas Anderson
and other supporters of unanimity believed that elected officials had
an independent obligation to determine whether legislation satisfied
constitutional requirements and that those determinations were entitled to more deference than the judiciary had accorded them. The
37

/d. at 1090-91.
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debate spilled over to a fourth day, with advocates of judicial review
invoking Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison 38
and supporters of the unanimity requirement sometimes implying that
they opposed giving courts the power to overturn statutes at all. 39
Peck repudiated that extreme position, though, explaining: "[Judicial
.review] is part of our system and we are not trying to take it away by
this proposal. ... The question is, how many judges should it require
in order to declare an act unconstitutional?"40
Much of the debate focused on the proposal's details rather than
on the legitimacy of judicial review. For example, Peck quickly
agreed to drop "adopted by the general assembly" when one delegate
pointed out that the proposal's language would not cover legislation
passed by the people through initiative and referendum, which was
one of the major reforms to come out of the convention. 41 Delegate
Frank Taggart of Wooster offered a substitute proposal providing for
a seven-member supreme court that could declare laws unconstitutional with the support of at least five justices. This smaller supermajority requirement recognized the legitimacy of complaints about judicial overreaching while avoiding the pitfalls of giving one justice an
effective veto. "There you have one more than a majority and it gives
additional moral force and effect," Taggart explained. 42 Peck did not
respond immediately.
Five days later, on the afternoon of April 9, Edmund King, a lawyer from Sandusky and a strong critic of the unanimity requirement,
asked Peck about the full reach of the proposal. King wondered
whether a single supreme court justice could effectively reverse a
unanimous court of appeals judgment holding a statute unconstitutional.43 Peck then responded to Taggart's alternative by offering a

38

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1110 (remarks
of Delegate Edmund B. King) (observing that "[a] court would be no longer a court" if it refused to determine the constitutionality of a statute when that question was "properly presented
before it").
39
See, e.g., PRocEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1079 (remarks of Delegate Stanley E.
Bowdle) (characterizing judicial review as "[t]his usurpation of power"). One delegate, Cleveland carpenter Harry D. Thomas, offered an amendment that would have prohibited the supreme
court from declaring any measure unconstitutional. See id. at 1101. See also id. at 1117 (remarks of Delegate Thomas) (denouncing the court for "practically nullif(ying] every safety law
made for the protection of workers in this state by their decisions on assumed risk, contributory
negligence and fellow-servant rule"). That idea was quietly tabled the next day. See id. at 1129.
40
See id. at 1125.
41
See id. at 1028.
42
ld. at 1065.
43
See id. at 1128.
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revised version that left the supreme court as a six-member body but
allowed a five-person majority to invalidate a law. 44
The next morning Peck conceded that an across-the-board unanimity rule "would be not workable" in the situation King posited. 45
Accordingly, the Cincinnatian produced yet another refinement: the
supreme court would have to be unanimous to strike down a law "[i]n
any case wherein the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed"; 46
it would take only a simple majority to affirm a court of appeals
judgment of invalidity. 47 He also made clear that the unanimity rule
would not apply to cases arising under the supreme court's original
jurisdiction. 48
Now,. however, another objection arose. S.A. Hoskins, a Wapakoneta lawyer, questioned the practicality of unanimity because not
all justices could participate in every case. The illness or recusal of
one member would, under Peck's proposal, preclude the court from
invalidating a law on constitutional grounds, at least when the court
of appeals had upheld the measure. Hoskins therefore proposed to
require that "all but one" justice go along with a finding of unconstitutionality. He explained: "Some one man on the court may have an
accident. He may be run over, or he may be sick and disabled.... If
we can not trust five of our supreme judges to pronounce a decision
on any proposition we are entertaining a very small opinion of
them." 49
After some additional questions, John D. Fackler of East Cleveland offered a reworded supermajority clause:
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court without the concurrence of all but one of the
judges sitting in the case, except in affirming a judgment of
the court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and
void. 5°

44

See id. at 1130.
/d. at 1141.
46
/d. at 1140.
47
Seeid.
48
See id. at 1142. At this point D.F. Anderson, perhaps the strongest proponent of unanimity, lamented the limited scope of the requirement: it would apply only when the supreme
court reversed a court of appeals judgroent upholding a law's constitutionality, not when the
lower court had found a law unconstitutional or when cases began in the supreme court. "That
is not much of a reform," he remarked. Peck replied: "That is all we can get." /d.
49
/d. at 1143.
50
/d. at 1145.
45
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This language embodied King's concern about giving one justice an
effective veto over affirming a court of appeals judgment of invalidity, which Peck had already accepted. Fackler's amendment actually
went beyond Hoskins' concern about a single justice's absence effectively preventing the high court from reversing the court of appeals
and striking down a law. The "all but one" provision sufficed to address that problem; limiting the focus to the justices "sitting in the
case" effectively lowered the supermajority requirement, implying
that the votes of all but two members could hold a law unconstitutional if one justice dissented and another did not participate. Nevertheless, Peck accepted Fackler's wording as a friendly amendment. 51
Perhaps more surprising, Anderson, the most vocal proponent of unanimity when the debate began, also supported Fackler's language. 52
Fackler apparently realized the problem with his amendment, because
a little later he offered a revised version that deleted the "sitting in the
case" phrase. As revised, his amendment now provided:
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court without the concurrence of all but one of the
judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the court of
appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void. 53
The delegates approved this version by a vote of 94-5. 54 That afternoon the question of the size of the supreme court arose once more.
George W. Knight, a law professor at Ohio State University, proposed
increasing the court to seven members. This would, he explained,
prevent the confusion that might arise if two courts of appeals disagreed on a law's constitutionality and the supreme court divided
three-to-three, which according to another provision of the proposal
meant that both judgments would be affirmed. 55 Peck responded that
this situation was extremely unlikely to arise and repeated his earlier
wish to avoid giving comfort to critics who might object to the creation of new judgeships. 56 After some further desultory discussion,

51
52

53
54

55

See id.
See id.
/d. at 1147.
/d.

See id. at 1158; supra text accompanying note 32.
56
See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1159; supra note 32. Peck added that he opposed
reducing the court to five members because that would force the ouster of a sitting judge, which
ntight also engender voter opposition. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1159.
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Knight's amendment and several others were tabled and Proposal No.
184 was approved on second reading, 78-28. 57
Seven weeks later, on May 27, the proposal returned to the floor
for third reading. Delegate Taggart, who had opposed the measure on
second reading, renewed his suggestion for a seven-member court
consisting of a chief justice and six others. 58 Unlike Professor Knight,
who had favored seven justices to minimize the likelihood of tie
votes, Taggart explained that the court needed a chief justice. The
1851 constitution made no separate provision for such a position. 59
Taggart argued that the chief justice would have important supervisory and administrative responsibilities over the entire judicial
branch. Establishing the position of chief justice as a constitutional
office would help the supreme court and improve the efficiency of the
judiciary throughout the state. 60 This time Peck agreed, noting that he
regarded a chief justice as "very desirable." 61
Meanwhile, the supermajority requirement for declaring laws unconstitutional was changed stylistically by the addition of the words
"at least" before "all but one." The final version read as follows:
No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the supreme court without the concurrence of at least all but one of
the judges, except in the affirmance of a judgment of the
court of appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void. 62
This version was supported on third reading by a vote of 97-5. 63
Four days later, on May 31, it returned to the floor unchanged from
the Committee on Arrangements and Phraseology and was formally
endorsed by a tally of 93-6. 64 On September 3, the voters narrowly
approved the entire package of changes in the judicial system, including the supermajority requirement, by a 52-48 percent margin. 65 That
57

PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 1163.

58

See id. at 1832; supra text accompanying note 42.
See 1 MARSHALL, supra note 27, at 222-23. Implementing the I883 constitutional
amendment, the legislature had defined the position of chief justice in terms of seniority: the
six-member tribunal was divided into two panels of three, with the senior member of each panel
presiding and the more senior of those designated as chief justice of the entire court when it sat
en bane. See Amer, supra note 31, at 206.
59

60
61
62

63
64

65

See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at I 832.
/d.

/d. at I833.
/d.
/d. at 1957.

The popular vote was 264,922 in favor and 244,375 against. /d. at 2I I2. This proposal
would have lost without strong support in urban counties in Northeast Ohio. See Sponholtz,
supra note I I, at 244-45.
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provision would remain on the books for more than half a century
before its many problems led to its repeal.

ll. THE SUPERMAJORITY RULE IN ACTION
As approved by the voters, the supermajority requirement applied

to all cases within the Ohio Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and
to those cases within its appellate jurisdiction in which the court of
appeals had upheld the constitutionality of the law at issue. The requirement did not apply, however, when the supreme court was reviewing a court of appeals decision holding a law unconstitutional.
The requirement's terms left open several important questions: What
was a "law"? What did it mean to say that the supreme court "held" a
law "unconstitutional and void"? What were lower courts to do when
a majority, but less than the requisite supermajority, concluded that a
law was unconstitutional? All of these questions would arise in due
course. In the end, although the supermajority requirement generated
principled opposition, 66 it was ultimately done in as much by some
entirely foreseeable practical difficulties as by renewed appreciation
of the value of judicial review. Perhaps the most troublesome problem
related to the exception for laws that had been found unconstitutional
by the court of appeals, which held out the prospect that the validity
of a statute would turn on what a lower court had decided.
To the extent that the supermajority requirement was intended to
remind the supreme court that the people wanted the judiciary to
show greater deference to the legislature, the message came through
loud and clear. In one of the first post-1912 cases challenging the
constitutionality of a statute, Chief Justice Hugh Nichols observed
that the new requirement "reminded [us] that [the power of judicial
review] should· be exercised with the greatest possible care and reserve. " 67 It is difficult to assess the extent to which the provision ac66

Delegate David J. Nye, an Elyria lawyer, told the convention that a simple majority
vote should suffice for the supreme court to find a law unconstitutional and warned that the
supermajority requirement was "wrong in principle and wrong in practice." PROCEEDINGS,
supra note 22, at 1145. Outside Ohio, one commentator denounced the requirement only a few
weeks after the voters approved it, expressing the hope that "no other state will follow the
example of Ohio by limiting the scope of judicial power" and that the Buckeye State would
soon rethink this foolish experiment in legislative omnipotence. Everett P. Wheeler, The New
Constitution of Ohio-Power of Courts to Review Acts of the Legislatures, 75 CENT. L.J. 437,
442 (1912). Wheeler accompanied his denunciation of the new provision with a blast at "ambulance chasers" who were cluttering up the judicial system with tort cases they handled on a
contingency basis. See id. at 441-42. AI; evidence of the need for judicial control of legislatures,
he cited the Reconstruction Era and noted approvingly that the withdrawal of federal troops
from the former Confederacy allowed "the white people of those states ... to manage their
affairs in their own way." Id.. at 440.
67
State ex reL Turner v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 117 N.E. 232, 234 (Ohio 1917).
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tually affected decisions, however, because the Ohio Supreme Court
rarely invoked the supermajority provision as a basis for deferring to
the legislature. 68
The first case in which the supermajority provision clearly affected the outcome was Barker v. City of Akron. 69 In this 1918 decision, four justices believed that a state law requiring counties to pay
the cost of municipal special elections was unconstitutiona1. 70 Because the court of appeals had upheld the law's validity, it took six
justices to overturn the measure. Accordingly, the minority of three
justices effectively prevailed, and the court was obliged to affirm the
lower court's judgment. 71
It took another four years for the Ohio Supreme Court to muster a
six-justice majority to invalidate a law that the court of appeals had
upheld, but even that case revealed some unanticipated complexities.
The 1922 ruling in Morton v. State 72 struck down a law that prohibited a criminal defendant who was in custody from deposing out-ofstate material witnesses who would not be available to testify at trial.
The statute permitted defendants who were not in custody to conduct
such out-of-state depositions. Four justices subscribed to an opinion
holding the statute unconstitutional and requiring that the defendant
be permitted to conduct his out-of-state depositions. 73 Two other justices noted their agreement that the statute unconstitutionally denied
equal protection to in-custody defendants but concluded that the defendant was not entitled to conduct his depositions. 74 On this basis,
the majority opinion claimed that the requisite six justices "concurr[ed] in the [statute's] unconstitutionality,"75 although another
member characterized the situation as "a plain concession on the part .

68

Only a handful of cases in the first quarter-century after the supermajority requirement
was adopted seem to have been affected by its provisions, but analysis of voting patterns cannot
give a complete picture because the court might not explicitly acknowledge the requirement's
impact in some cases. See Katherine B. Fite & Louis Baruch Rubinstein, Curbing the Supreme
Court-State Experiences and Federal Proposals, 35 MICH. L. REV. 762,774 (1937).
69
121 N.E. 646 (Ohio 1918) (per curiam).
70
The law exempted counties from paying for municipai general elections. See W. Rolland Maddox, Minority Control of Court Decisions in Ohio, 24 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 638, 639
(1930).
71
See Barker, 121 N.E. at 646.
72
138 N.E. 45 (Ohio 1922).
73
See id. at 47-48.
74
One justice explained that the defendant had failed to show that his witnesses could not
testify at trial. See id. at 49 (Wanamaker, J., dissenting). The other did not explain his reasoning. See id. at 48 (Johnson, J., concurring in the fust proposition of the syllabus [finding the
statute unconstitutional] but not in the judgment).
75
Jd. at47.
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of two of the judges" designed to get around the supermajority requirement. 76
At times the court tried to evade the supermajority requirement.
For example, in Patten v. Aluminum Castings Co., 77 a five-member
majority voted to overturn a judgment for an employee who had been
badly injured in a fall from a defective scaffold. At issue was a statute
imposing liability on employers who provided defective scaffolding.
If the statute were valid, its violation permitted the employee to recover in tort; if not, he could only obtain a smaller worker's compensation a ward. Three members of the court concluded that the scaffolding statute was not a "lawful requirement" within the meaning of the
Worker's Compensation Clause of the Ohio Constitution because it
was impermissibly vague. 78 Two other justices agreed that the employee could not recover in tort but emphasized that they were expressing no view on the statute's validity. 79 One of the concurring
members, Chief Justice Carrington Marshall, warned that the lead
opinion had effectively invalidated the scaffolding law without once
using the word "unconstitutional" in a clear attempt to circumvent the
supermajority requirement. 80
In a sense, Patten had a limited impact because its specific holding about the definition of a "lawful requirement" was overruled the
following year. 81 But Chief Justice Marshall's warning proved prophetic in another sense. He noted that the courts of appeals had
reached conflicting conclusions about whether various statutes were
lawful requirements for worker's compensation purposes. This held
out the prospect that the number of votes required for the supreme
court to overturn those statutes would depend on what each court of
appeals had concluded. His prediction was soon vindicated in a series
of worker's compensation cases, although not ones dealing with the
meaning of lawful requirements. Meanwhile, the problem also arose
in another area where it would take a decade to unsnarl.

76

Bd. of Educ. v. City of Columbus, 160 N.E. 902, 904 (Ohio 1928). This opinion was
written by Chief Justice Carrington Marshall, who had dissented in Morton. See Morton, 138
N .E. at 48 (Marshall, C.J ., dissenting).
77
136 N.E. 426 (Ohio 1922).
78
See id. at 428.
79
See id. at 431 (Hough, J ., concurring) ("I know of no reason by which the constitutionality of the act can be assailed."); id. at 432 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) ("I concur in the judgment ... solely upon the ground that there is no evidence shown by the record to support the
verdict [against the employer].").
80
!d. at 436 (Marshall, C.J ., dissenting).
81
See Ohio Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Fender, 141 N.E. 269, 277 (Ohio 1923).
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The importance of the court of appeals first became painfully apparent in the field of worker's compensation, which was one of the
main areas of contention leading to the adoption of the supermajority
requirement. In the 1923 case of DeWitt v. State ex rel. Crabbe, 82 two
members of the court upheld a statute that imposed a fifty percent
penalty against deadbeat employers. The statute gave employers the
option of paying premiums to the state worker's compensation fund
or promptly paying the full amount of any worker's compensation
award to an injured employee; the fifty percent assessment applied if
the employer chose neither option. 83 Five justices believed that the
penalty provision violated state and federal guarantees of due process
and equal protection}4 but the supermajority requirement meant that
the contrary views of the two minority members prevailed. 85 In a
sense, this ruling vindicated the progressive reformers who believed
that the supermajority requirement would make it more difficult for
the supreme court to strike down worker-protection laws. But this
victory proved to be short-lived. Other courts of appeals declined to
follow the judgment in De Witt, choosing instead to endorse the majority view. Five years later, in State ex rel. Bredwell v. Hershner, 86 a
six-to-one majority held that the fifty percent penalty was in fact unconstitutional, thereby effectively overruling De Witt. 87
These cases highlighted a major problem with the supermajority
requirement. The exception allowing a simple majority of the supreme court to declare a law unconstitutional when the court of appeals had reached the same conclusion left open the prospect that the
number of votes required for the supreme court to strike down· a law
would vary depending on what conclusion the lower court had
reached. De Witt demonstrated that this entirely foreseeable situation
was more than hypothetical. Hershner resolved the problem with regard to the fifty percent penalty statute, but the underlying difficulty
of varying majorities remained unabated.
The problem had arisen again even before Hershner was decided.
This time it appeared in connection with a statute that required municipalities to provide free water service to public schools. In City of
82

141 N.E. 551 (Ohio 1923).
See id. at 554-55.
84
See id. at 557.
85
See id.
86
161 N.E. 334 (Ohio 1928).
87
See id. at 335. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals on another issue, however. The lower court erroneously overturned the entire judgment rather than simply setting
aside the fifty percent penalty, so the supreme court reinstated the award without the penalty.
See id. at 335-36.
83
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East Cleveland v. Board of Education, 88 five justices concluded that
the free-water law was unconstitutional. 89 Because the court of appeals had upheld the statute, the supermajority requirement applied
and required affrrmance on a two-to-five vote. This situation was so
disconcerting that Chief Justice Marshall began his dissenting opinion
by paraphrasing the opening sentence of the Declaration of Independence to complain about the "separate though inferior station to which
the amendment of 1912 has consigned" the majority. 90 Three years
later, after a different court of appeals had invalidated the same statute despite the minority judgment in City of East Cleveland, the fivemember majority this time prevailed: in Board of Education v. City of
Columbus 91 the free-water statute was struck down by a five-to-two
vote. Chief Justice Marshall, writing again for the majority but this
time in an opinion announcing the judgment, explained that the two
cases were "in every essential detail identical" and that the court's
personnel had not changed in the interim. 92 Although the syllabus in
the Columbus case purported to overrule City of East Cleveland, 93 the
opinion more accurately described the real situation: the free-water
law was unconstitutional in Columbus but constitutional in East
Cleveland, an absurdity directly attributable to the supermajority requirement and its peculiar exception. 94 The immediate problem was
88

148 N.E. 350 (Ohio 1925).
See id. at 350 ("[t]here being less [sic] than six judges" who regard the law as unconstitutional); id. at 354 (Marshall, C.J., joined by Matthias, Allen, Kinkade & Robinson, JJ., dissenting) ("In the opinion of the majority of this court, [the law] should be declared to be unconstitutional .... ").
90
ld. at 352 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). The full passage reads:
When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for the majority of the Supreme Court of Ohio to differ from the judgment pronounced by the minority, and to assume the separate though inferior station to which the amendment of 1912 has consigned them, a decent respect to the opinions of the bench and bar of the state requires that they
should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.
ld. at 352-53.
91
160 N.E. 902 (Ohio 1928).
92
ld. at 902.
93
See id. (syllabus 'II 1) ("That portion of [the law] which prohibits a city or village or
waterworks department thereof from making a charge for supplying water for the use of the
public school building or other public buildings ... is unconstitutional and void.").
94
See id. at 903 (describing the resulting state of affairs as a "deplorable situation"). In
fact, the whole affair was even more bizarre than the text suggests. After losing its initial challenge to the free-water law, the City of East Cleveland contrived to bring a second challenge in
a different court. Although its first suit went to the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth District, which upheld the law, city authorities somehow managed to get the second case heard by
the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Ninth District, which ordinarii y lacked jurisdiction over cases
arising in Cuyahoga County and which likewise upheld the law. See id. at 902-03. The City of
Columbus, which was located in a different appellate district, filed its challenge in an admitted
effort "to make effective the opinion of a majority of the Supreme Court" in the East Cleveland
89
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resolved in 1935, ten years after City of East Cleveland, when six
justices subscribed to a per curiam opinion invalidating the free-water
law. 95
Two other problems with the supermajority requirement also
emerged. One concerned its application to municipal ordinances. The
court got hopelessly tangled up in this problem in two 1927 cases. In
Fullwood v. City of Canton, 96 five justices thought that a particular
ordinance was unconstitutional, and three justices believed that the
supermajority requirement did not apply to local ordinances. 97 This
meant that four members thought that a simple majority could invalidate the ordinance, but those four members split evenly over the validity of the particular ordinance. Because two of the four justices
who believed that a simple majority was sufficient also believed that
the particular ordinance was valid, they refused to subscribe to a ruling of invalidity. 98 Throwing up its collective hands in confusion, the
supreme court simply affirmed the court of appeals judgment upholding the ordinance. 99 A similarly puzzling division occurred later that
same year in Meyers v. Copelan, 100 resulting in a judgment upholding
the validity of a Cincinnati ordinance that forbade jewelry auctions.
This time four justices thought the ordinance unconstitutional, but
three of those four also believed that the supermajority requirement
applied to local ordinances. 101 Because the court of appeals had upheld the ordinance, 102 there were not enough votes to strike it down. 103
Seven years later, on rehearing in Village of Brewster v. Hill, 104 the
court unanimously held that the supermajority requirement did not
apply to municipal ordinances. 105

case. /d. at 903.
95
See Bd. of Educ. v. Village of Willard, 199 N.E. 74 (Ohio 1935) (per curiam). In this
case the court of appeals had followed the Columbus decision, which meant that the supreme
court in affirming needed only four votes. The unanimous ruling by the six participating justices
was not technically necessary but sufficed once and for all to inter the free-water statute.
96
158 N.E. 171 (Ohio) (per curiam), error dismissed, 275 U.S. 484 (1927). Although the
opinion is silent on the matter, the ordinance reportedly dealt with the licensing of electricians.
See Robert L. Hausser, Limiting the Voting Power of the Szipreme Court: Procedure in the
States, 5 OHIO ST. LJ. 54, 77 (1938).
97
See Fullwood, 158 N.E. at 172.
98
Seeid.
99
See id. at 171-72.
100
160 N.E. 855 (Ohio 1927) (per curiam).
101
See id. at 855-56.
102
See id. at 855.
103
See id. at 856.
104
191 N.E. 366 (Ohio 1934).
105
The court based its conclusion on the 1912 convention's repeated use of the word "Jaw"
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The other problem with the supermajority requirement concerned
nonparticipating judges, an issue that had generated discussion at the
1912 convention. 106 It quickly 'became apparent that it would be
nearly impossible to invalidate a law with less than a full bench. The
absence of three members in the 1922 case of McBride v. White Motor Co. 107 immediately doomed a challenge to the constitutionality of
a state law that prohibited Ohio taxpayers from deducting federal tax
payments on their state tax returns. 108 Similarly, in Royal Green
Coach Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 109 an original action seeking judicial review of an agency decision refusing to authorize new
bus service between the cities of Dayton and Hamilton, one justice
did not sit. 110 This meant that the remaining six justices would have to
agree that the regulatory statute at issue was unconstitutional in order
for the challenge to succeed. In fact, only one justice sympathized
with the constitutional argument, but he conceded that none of his
colleagues agre~d with him. 111
Meanwhile, the court continued occasionally to invoke the supermajority requirement to uphold the constitutionality of laws that
most justices regarded as invalid. For example, in State ex ref. Jones
v. Zangerle, 112 a three-to-four vote upheld a statute that increased the
per diem payment to judges sitting by assigrtment outside their home
jurisdiction. The Cuyahoga County auditor refused to pay the higher
amount to a visiting judge because of a constitutional prohibition
against increasing judicial salaries during their term of office. The
visiting judge had been elected before the higher per diem was enacted.113 Three justices believed that the law increasing per diem

to refer to measures enacted by the legislature and by its use of the word "statute" in explanation
of the supermajority requirement provided to voters, but the opinion did not refer to the actual
convention debates. See id. at 367. The entire problem might have been avoided had anyone
examined the debates, which demonstrated that the word "law" was substituted for "statute
adopted by the general assembly" out of concern that a simple majority could invalidate a measure adopted by initiative. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
106
See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
107
140 N.E. 942 (Ohio 1922) (per curiam).
108
The four participating justices split two-to-two on the question, although only one of
those who regarded the provision as unconstitutional noted a formal dissenting vote. See id. at
942.
109
143 N.E. 547 (Ohio 1924).
liD
See id. at 549.
Ill
See id. at 547-48. The court went on to hold unanimously that the record contained no
evidence that the agency had abused its discretion in deciding not to grant the challenger a
certificate to operate bus service between the two cities. See id. at 548-49.
112
!59 N.E. 564 (Ohio 1927).
113
See id. at 564.
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payments to visiting judges was valid because the state's Emoluments
Clause applied to regular salaries but not to payments for special assignments. 114 This minority vote was enough to sustain the increased
per diem, because the case arose as an original action so that the supermajority requirement applied if the measure were to be struck
down. 115 A similar three-to-four vote in another original action, State
ex rei. Williams v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 116 upheld a law
authorizing payments to injured employees of insolvent employers
who were unable to pay worker's compensation premiums to the
state. Four justices thought this scheme was unconstitutional, but once
more the supermajority requirement allowed the minority who saw
the measure as permissible to prevai1. 117
The supermajority controversy persisted through the 1920s, with
matters coming to a head in Chief Justice Marshall's majority opinion
in the Columbus case. He denounced the provision as "destroy[ing]"
what he called "the most important function of courts of last resort":
to reconcile conflicting rulings by lower courts. 118 Marshall devoted
several more pages to denouncing the 1912 measure, 119 but much of
the steam went out of the debate in 1930 after the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected a federal constitutional challenge to the supermajority requirement. In Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 12°Chief Justice Hughes wrote for a unanimous Court in turning
aside taxpayer objections to the state's procedures for creating and
maintaining public parks. The Ohio Supreme Court, by a two-to-five

I 14

See id. at 565.
See id.
I 16
156 N.E. 101 (Ohio 1927).
I 17
See id. at 102, 104. Sometimes a minority invoked the superrnajority requirement in
cases where it did not seem to apply. For example, two justices concluded that it would be
unconstitutional to permit a referendum on an administrative reorganization act that had been
passed as an emergency measure because the 1912 amendments exempted emergency measures
from referendum procedures. See State ex rei. Durbin v. Smith, 133 N.E. 457,460 (Ohio 1921)
(per curiam). A taxpayer sought a referendum because he regarded the emergency justifications
as spurious. See id. at 457. The fundamental issue was the extent to which courts must accept a
legislative emergency declaration at face value. See id. at 461; id. at 462 (Marshall, CJ., dissenting). Although this issue might have been couched in constitutional terms, see id. at 469
(Johnson, J., dissenting); id. at 474 (Wanamaker, J., dissenting), it need not have been, see id. at
463 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The constitutionality of the [statute] is not an issue in this controversy."). The same result occurred in a companion case. See State ex rei. Burke v. Smith, 133
N.E. 480 (Ohio 1921) (per curiam) (denying relief for the reasons set forth in Durbin).
118
Bd. ofEduc. v. City ofCo1umbus, 160 N.E. 902,903 (Ohio 1928).
119
See id. at 903-05 ("This amendment to the Ohio Constitution is without a parallel in any
state in the Union.").
120
281 U.S. 74 (1930), aff'g State ex rei. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 166 N.E. 407
(Ohio 1929).
I 15
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vote, upheld the constitutionality of the statutes at issue. 121 Hughes
first rebuffed a due process challenge to the supermajority requirement on the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment does not ordinarily mandate any right to appeal from a fundamentally fair lower court
proceeding. 122 He also dismissed an equal protection argument by
noting that the challengers had failed to show that similarly situated
Ohioans had been treated differently: although the East Cleveland and
Columbus cases demonstrated the possibility of conflicting rulings
about the same statute, there had been no such conflict in connection
with the park-district law, so it was premature to address an issue that
might not ultimately entail a federal constitutional violation. 123
The U.S. Supreme Court never again addressed the validity of
Ohio's supermajority requirement. 124 The legal controversy abated to
some extent for a time, although debate continued in academic journals in the wake of Bryant. 125 The requirement also attracted attention
during the New Deal disputes that culminated in President Franklin
D. Roosevelt's abortive Court-packing scheme. 126
But the supermajority requirement did not go away. It remained
on the books and sporadically affected the outcome of cases. After a
hiatus of more than a dozen years, the Ohio Supreme Court struck
down a sloppily drafted liquor-control measure in State v. Chester. 127
At issue was a provision prohibiting public possession of "an opened
bottle, flask or container." 128 An earlier phrase in the same provision
forbade possession of "an opened bottle, flask or container, contain121

See Ohio ex rei. Bryant. 281 U.S. at 77; State ex rei. Bryant, 166 N.E. at 415.
See Ohio ex rei. Bryant, 281 U.S. at 80.
123
See id. at 80-81.
124
See Gottlieb v. Mahoning Valley Sanitary Dist., 281 U.S. 770 (1930}, dismissing appealfrom Shook v. Mahoning Valley Sanitary Dist., 166 N.E. 415 (Ohio 1929) (rejecting con122

stitutional challenges to a statutory scheme analogous to the park-district law baEed on many of
the same arguments that were presented in the park cases).
125

See, e.g., Carl L. Meier, Power of the Ohio Supreme Court to Declare Laws
Unconstitutional, 5 U. CIN. L. REV. 293 (1931) (criticizing the requirement); Edwin 0. Stene, Is
There Minority Control of Court Decisions in Ohio?, 9 U. CIN. L. REv. 23 (1935) (offering
qualified support for the requirement); Harvey Walker, Need for Constitutional Revision in
Ohio, 4 U. CIN. L. REV. 339, 348 (1930) (urging repeal of the requirement). Scholarly criticism
continued in later years. See, e.g., Warren Cunningham, The Judiciary in Ohio, 20 U. CIN. L.
REV. 239, 260 (1951).
126

See, e.g., Fite & Rubinstein, supra note 68, at 773-79; Osmond K. Fraenkel, What Can
Be Done About the Constitution and the Supreme Court?, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 212, 222-23
(1937); Hausser, supra note 96, at 56-84. The Ohio rule also figured in the debate over Senator
William E. Borah's unsuccessfull923 proposal to require a seven-justice majority for the U.S.
Supreme Court to hold an act of Congress unconstitutional. See Ross, supra note 21, at 225-26;
see generally id. at 218-32.
127

128

42 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 1942).

ld. at 994-95.
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ing intoxicating liquor, in a state liquor store." 129 Four of the six participating justices concluded that the omission of the qualifying
phrase "containing intoxicating liquor" from the public-possession
clause rendered that clause unconstitutional. 130 The other two justices
treated the omission as a slip of the legislative pen and, like the court
of appeals, construed the public-possession provision narrowly to
cover only intoxicants. That was enough for the minority to prevail,
so the public-possession law was upheld on a two-to-four vote. 131
The absence of one justice in Chester meant that the six participating justices would have had to agree unanimously that the statute
was unconstitutional. As McBride showed two decades earlier, 132 the
lack of a full bench could prevent the supreme court from invalidating
an unconstitutional law. This situation finally received serious attention soon after Chester was decided, although it is not clear that this
case was the impetus for change. In 1943, the Judicial Council of
Ohio recommended that Article IV, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution be amended to allow a court of appeals judge to sit by designation whenever a member of the Ohio Supreme Court was "unable, by
reason of illness, disability, disqualification, or other cause," to participate in a case. 133 The principal rationale for this recommendation
was the need to provide litigants with a full bench to avoid the prospect of three-to-three deadlocks, a phenomenon that had occurred
thirteen times between 1932 and 1942Y4 The recommendation went
on to note that failing to replace justices who could not hear a case
placed an "unfair burden" on appellants challenging the validity of
statutes, particularly when more than one justice did not participate. 135
The voters approved this change in 1944, but it did not address the
critics' other concerns nor did it end the phenomenon of minority
decisions upholding the constitutionality of challenged laws.
The early 1950s produced a spate of new decisions under the supermajority provision. In University of Cincinnati v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 136 five justices concluded that two statutes exempting real
estate owned by educational institutions from property taxes were
invalid because they conferred a broader exemption than was consti129
130
131
132

/d. at 994 (emphasis added).

See id. at 999 (Hart, J., joined by Turner, Matthias & Zimmerman, JJ., dissenting).
See id. at 995.
See supra notes I 07-08 and accompanying text.

133

SIXTH REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF OHIO TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
OHIO 16 (1943).
134

135
136

See id. at 16-17.
Jd.atl7.
91 N.E.2d 502 (Ohio 1950).

462

CASE WESTERN RESERVE IA W REVIEW

[Vol. 52:441

tutionally permissible. 137 The constitutional provision dealt with
"public school houses," whereas the statutes exempted income received by educational institutions and public school districts. Two
justices questioned the wisdom of the statutes but found no constitutional infirmity. 138 Accordingly, the superrnajority requirement meant
that the laws were upheld by a two-to-five vote. 139
Another minority vote upheld a statute exempting certain municipal police and fire personnel from worker's compensation coverage in
State ex rel. English v. Industrial Commission. 140 The statute denied
worker's compensation to police officers and firefighters who were
eligible for pensions; 141 the injured firefighter was receiving more
from his pension than he would have gotten from worker's compensation. 142 Although the precise vote was not indicated, the court in its
initial ruling and again on rehearing said that a majority, but fewer
than six justices, believed the law was unconstitutional and that this
was insufficient to overturn the law. 143
Similarly, in State ex rel. Steer v. Baber, 144 the court invoked the
superrnajority rule to uphold a provision that required an administrator's consent before a person at least seventy years old could be
committed to a state mental health institution. 145 It is not clear that the
rule affected this decision, however, as only three justices agreed that
the provision in question conferred unfettered discretion or arbitrary
administrative authority. 146
Then in Grandle v. Rhodes, 147 the court first invoked and then
avoided the supermajority requirement. At issue was an appropriation
from the Highway Improvement Fund for preliminary studies on a
project to build a parking garage beneath the state capitol. 148 When
the case was first argued, the court viewed the controlling issue as
being whether the appropriation for plannirtg a parking garage was for
constitutionally required highway purposes. Four justices concluded
137

See id. at 503-04.
See id. at 504 (opinion of Stewart & Taft, JJ.).
139
Seeid.
140
115 N.E.2d 395 (Ohio 1953), adhered to on reh'g, 117 N.E.2d 22 (Ohio 1954).
141
See id. at 396 (opinion of Taft, J.).
142
See id. at 395.
143
See id. at 396; State ex rei. English, 117 N.E.2d at 23.
144
118 N.E.2d 530 (Ohio 1954) (per curiam).
145
See id. at 531.
146
See id. (Stewart, J., joined by Weygandt, C.J., and Middleton, J., dissenting).
147
139 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio 1956) (per curiam), rev'd per curiam on reh 'g, 140 N.E.2d 897
(Ohio 1957).
148
See Grandle, 139 N.E.2d at 328.
138
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that the appropriation was unconstitutional, 149 but three others disagreed. Because fewer than six justices thought there was a constitutional problem, the challenge to the appropriation failed. 150 On rehearing, the court determined that the supermajority requirement was
never triggered because the appropriation was not for "statutory
highway purposes" and hence did not authorize the expenditure of
Highway Improvement Fund money for the project. 151 Despite an
apoplectic (and now solitary) dissent objecting to this feat of legerdemain in a case where the legal arguments at every stage had focused on the constitutional issue, 152 a five-to-one vote upheld the
challenge to the use of the highway fund but rsermitted the use of
other revenue for the preliminary garage studies. 53
The final 1950s case presented one last problem with the supermajority requirement, that of determining when a law has been declared unconstitutional. In R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Department
of Education, 154 the court divided five-to-two on this question. At
issue was the Ohio Motion Picture Censorship Act, which required
state approval before movies could be shown. The Ohio Supreme
Court upheld this scheme in Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of
Education, 155 which affirmed the censorship division's refusal to
permit the showing of the film version of Richard Wright's Native
Son and other movies. The U.S. Supreme Court summarily reversed
that judgment in a one-sentence ruling that cited its 1952 decision
156
invalidating a similar New York statute. Other distributors quickly
challenged the denial of permits to show their movies, arguing that
the U.S. Supreme Court's summary reversal in Superior Films had
invalidated Ohio's censorship law. A five-judge majority of the Ohio
Supreme Court agreed with this claim but noted that the lack of a
sixth vote prevented the state court from holding the law unconstitutional.157 Two justices resisted the conclusion that Superior Films had
nullified the statute, contending that the grounds for that summary
disposition were ambiguous. 158 The majority opinion avoided the pos149

See id. at 329-30 (Bell, J., joined by Hart, Zimmerman & Stewart, JJ ., dissenting).
See id. at 329.
151
See Grand/e, 140 N.E.2d at 897-98.
152
See id. at 899-900 (Weygandt, C.J., dissenting).
153
See id. at 898.
154
122 N.E.2d 769 (Ohio 1954).
155
112 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio 1953).
156
Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't ofEduc., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam) (citing Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (I 952)).
157
See R.KO. Radio Pictures, Inc., 122 N.E.2d at 771.
158
See id. at 772 (Weygandt, C.J., dissenting); id. at 775 (Hart, J., dissenting).
150
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sibility of a minority veto by determining that, because the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling was binding, a censorship order that was based
on the controversial statute could not have been proper. 159

ill.

THE DEMISE OF THE SUPERMAJORITY RULE

In short, by the time Mapp reached the Ohio Supreme Court,
many problems with the supermajority requirement had become clear.
The court had struggled to define what "laws" were covered by the
requirement, faced the difficulty of deciding constitutional challenges
with less than a full bench, divided over what it meant to say that a
law had been "held" unconstitutional, tried to avoid the requirement
when possible, and faced the disconcerting possibility that laws
would be valid in some places but void in others due to the differing
attitudes of the courts of appeals. Some of these problems had been
resolved. The court got out of its self-imposed predicament about
municipal ordinances, and the 1944 amendment provided for a full
bench when disability or recusal forced one or more justices not to sit
in particular cases. But nothing had been done to address the prospect
of inconsistent rulings, a prospect that should have been obvious to
Peck and the other 1912 convention delegates when they added the
exception to the supermajority requirement for cases in which the
court of appeals had also found a law unconstitutional. Finally, the
prospects for invalidating the requirement were bleak. The U.S. Supreme Court had turned aside a federal constitutional challenge thirty
years earlier in Bryant, and no case had arisen to test the possibility
left open in that case that inconsistent rulings in different appellate
districts might violate the Equal Protection Clause.
For all the controversy Mapp generated, that decision did not undermine the supermajority rule. Shortly after the Ohio Supreme Court
failed to invalidate the obscenity statute, another criminal defendant
sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. In Toth v. Gilbert, 160 a
three-judge federal district court denied the injunction. The court refused to intervene in a pending state prosecution, explaining that there
were no grounds to assume the state courts' inadequacy in addressing
First Amendment issues 161 and noting the possibility of review by the
U.S. Supreme Court if necessary. 162

159
160
161
162

See id. at 771.
184 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1960) (3-judge court).
See id. at 168.
See id. at 170.
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There were two last episodes in the supermajority saga before the
requirement was laid to rest. One dealt with highway funding. In State
ex rel. Lynch v. Rhodes, 163 a four-member majority concluded that the
sale of certificates of obligation to finance highway projects were
state debts that violated constitutional provisions regulating the incurrence of debts. 164 Because three other justices disagreed, the constitutional challenge failed on a three-to-four vote. 165
The last episode involved Ohio's fair-trade laws, which allowed
manufacturers to require their products to be sold at minimum prices
despite the desire of some retailers to offer discounts. Mter the state
supreme court invalidated one fair-trade statute in 1958, 166 the legislature enacted a new statute that sought to address the defects of the
original. In Hudson Distributors, Inc. v. Upjolzn Co., 167 a fourmember majority of the supreme court concluded that the new law
contained the same constitutional defects as did the old. 168 Three of
their colleagues disagreed, resulting in another three-to-four ruling
upholding the validity of a statute. 169 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of a federal statute authorizing state fair-trade
laws. 170 Justice Goldberg's opinion in an eight-to-one decision alluded to Ohio's supermajority requirement but attached no special
significance to it. 171 But this did not end the fair-trade story. As with
the free-water law three decades earlier, 172 some lower courts held the
new fair-trade law invalid under the Ohio Constitution. 173 Accordingly, the law was valid in some parts of the state but not in others.
The supreme court fmally resolved the matter in a four-to-three-decision upholding the statute in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Ontario Store of Price Hill, Inc. 174
The supermajority requirement was repealed on May 7, 1968,
when the voters approved the Modern Courts Amendment to the Ohio
Constitution. This proposal substantially revised Article IV, the judiciary chapter, to reorganize the court system and rationalize the be163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
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208 N.E.2d 906 (Ohio 1965) (per curiam).
See id. at 911 (Taft, CJ.,joined by Zimmerman, Matthias & O'Neill, JJ.).
See id. at 906.
See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc .. 147 N.E.2d 481 (Ohio 1958).
190 N.E.2d 460 (Ohio 1963).
See id. at 466 (Zimmerman, 1., joined by Matthias, O'Neill & Gibson, 11 ., dissenting).
See id. at 465-66 (Griffith, 1., joined by Taft, CJ ., and Herbert, 1.).
See Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 386 (1964).
See id. at 388 & n.3.
See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Bu1ova Watch Co. v. Ontario Store, 176 N.E.2d 527 (Ohio C.P. 1961 ).
223 N.E.2d 592 (Ohio 1967).
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wildering set of tribunals below the courts of appeals. 175 Eliminating
the supermajority requirement was little more than a footnote to the
larger project, and the repeal provoked almost no debate. 176 Just over
a month after the vote, the supreme court in City of Euclid v.
Heaton 177 held that the repeal had taken effect immediately. 178
CONCLUSION

The demise of Ohio's supermajority requirement suggests that
this well-intentioned experiment was at best a noble failure, at worst a
disaster that endured far too long. Proponents viewed the requirement
as a way to protect progressive reforms against a hostile judiciary. To
a degree--but only to a degree--the proponents were correct. Some
worker's compensation laws survived because the court lacked the
necessary six votes to overturn them. A good example is Williams, in
which a three-member minority was able to uphold a law providing
compensation to employees of insolvent companies. 179 Other worker
victories were more ambiguous, though. The fifty percent penalty
provision that was upheld in DeWitt survived only because two justices voted to sustain it against five who regarded it as unconstitutional.180 Only five years later, one of the two justices in the minority
was replaced by a new judge who sided with the majority, providing
the crucial sixth vote to invalidate the fifty percent penalty provision
in Hershner. 181 And even when there were at least two justices sympathetic to worker interests, a creative majority could evade the sixvote requirement by statutory construction, as Patten shows. 182
These cases suggest that the supermajority requirement made it
more difficult for the Ohio Supreme Court to invalidate legislation.
There might also have been cases in which the court, without explicitly addressing the requirement, interpreted statutes narrowly to avoid
a potential constitutional issue. No evidence supporting this hypothesis has come to light, however.
In any event, judicial deference to the legislature is not always
desirable. Later rulings like R.K.O. and Mapp suggest that the super175

See generally William W. Milligan & James E. Pohlman, The 1968 Modern Courts
Amendmellt to the Ohio Constitution, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 811 ( 1968).
176
See id. at 845-46.
177
238 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio 1968).
178
ld. at 796.
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See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
180
See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
181
See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
182
See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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majority requirement made it more difficult to sustain civil liberties
claims, particularly those involving the First Amendment. The Ohio
Supreme Court's Mapp ruling, in which only four justices regarded
the obscenity law as unconstitutional, graphically illustrates the point.
Only because of the supermajority requirement did Dollree Mapp lose
in the state courts. 183 But R.K. 0. also suggests the fragility of First
Amendment claims under a system that was promoted by an earlier
group of progressives. Had it not been for the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Ohio movie censorship law would have remained on the books
even longer than it did because only five Ohio justices saw the
scheme as constitutionally troublesome. 184
The worker's compensation cases suggest that the real problem
was never the number of votes required to declare a law unconstitutional but rather the composition of the judiciary. If the members of
the supreme court were chosen by a process that favored employer
interests, a supermajority requirement could have only limited value.
Yet the system of electing judges has become firmly entrenched despite persistent criticism that some form of merit selection would produce a better and more enlightened judiciary. 185
Meanwhile, the difficulty in deciding whether municipal ordinances were subject to the supermajority requirement and the complications arising from the absence of a full bench might be taken as
evidence of deeper problems with the requirement. 186 Both of those
situations were addressed after some delay, the former by the supreme
court and the latter through a constitutional amendment. 187
Perhaps the most disturbing problem was the exception for cases
in which the supreme court affirmed a court of appeals judgment of
unconstitutionality, because this provision held out the real possibility
of inconsistent decisions in different appellate districts. 188 As previously remarked, the difficulties posed by the exception were entirely
foreseeable when it was proposed at the 1912 constitutional conven183

See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
185
See, e.g., Francis R. Aumann, The Selection, Tenure, Retirement and Compensation of
Judges in Ohio, 5 U. CIN. L. REV. 408 (1931); Fred J. Milligan, The Proposed Changes in the
Selection and Tenure of Judges in Ohio, 4 Omo ST. L.J. 157 (1938). Even the ugly 2000 supreme court election campaign has not shaken the faith of supporters of judicial elections, some
of the most vociferous of whom come from organized labor. See Julie Carr Smyth, Legislators
Uninterested in Appointed Judges: Chief Justice Seeking Allies to Push Idea, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 18, 2001, at 2B. For further discussion of that campaign, see Jonathan L. Entin,
Judicial Selection and Political Culture, CAP. U. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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See supra notes 96-111 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes I 03-05 & 133-35 and accompanying text.
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189
tion.
This problem could easily have been remedied by a further
amendment like the 1944 change authorizing the use of court of appeals judges sitting by designation to provide a full supreme court
bench when necessary, but it never was. Instead, this relatively minor
feature became a lightning rod for criticism of the whole superrnajority idea. 190
Things need not have turned out that way. The Ohio experiment
attracted attention around the country when it was adopted, as well as
during the New Deal. Two other states adopted similar proposals
within a few years of Ohio's action. North Dakota amended its constitution in 1918 to require the concurrence of four of the five justices
for the state supreme court to invalidate a law. 191 Two years later Nebraska adopted a five-vote requirement for its seven-member supreme
court to declare a law unconstitutional. 192 North Dakota's provision
has generated almost no controversy. The supermajority provision has
come into play in only half a dozen reported decisions, and supreme
court justices have accepted the requirement without apparent complaint.193 The Nebraska requirement did not affect a decision for
nearly half a century after its adoption. The first case in which the
requirement actually applied was decided in 1968. 194 Several more
cases followed in short order. 195 Those rulings prompted criticism and
189

See supra notes 45-46,94 & 118 and accompanying text.
See Fite & Rubinstein, supra note 68, at 776.
191
See N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 89 (repealed and reenacted as N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4
(1976)). See generally Herbert L. Meschke & Ted Smith, The North Dakota Supreme Court: A
Century of Advances, 76 N.D. L. REV. 217, 247-48 (2000).
192
See NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2.
193
Judicial acquiescence was apparent in the very first case affected by the supermajority
requirement. See Daly v. Beery, 178 N.W. 104, Ill (N.D. 1920) (Birdzell, J.) (noting the need
to concur in the disposition due to the supermajority rule and stating that the court must "respect
it as a part of the fundamental law"). For other cases in which the North Dakota Supreme Court
has applied the supermajority rule without objection, see Haney v. North Dakota Workers
Comp. Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1994) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the
exclusion of farm laborers from worker's compensation); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511
N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994) (rejecting a challenge to the state's system of financing public education); State ex rei. Mason v. Baker, 288 N.W. 202 (N.D. 1939) (rejecting a challenge to the
creation of a commission to revise the state code); State ex rei. Sathre v. Bd. of Univ. and Sch.
Lands, 262 N.W. 60 (N.D. 1935) (rejecting a challenge to a law authorizing discounting of
interest due on loans made by the agency administering the state's school trust fund); Wilson v.
City of Fargo, 186 N.W. 263 (N.D. 1921) (rejecting a challenge to a measure providing for
popular vote to override tax limits).
194
See In re Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d 171 (Neb. 1968) (rejecting a challenge to a compulsory
sterilization statute for institutionalized mental patients), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cavitt v.
Nebraska, 396 U.S. 996 (1970).
195
See DeBacker v. Brainard, 161 N.W.2d 508 (Neb. 1968) (rejecting a constitutional
challenge to juvenile court statute), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 28 (1969); State ex rei. Belker v.
Bd. of Educ. Lands and Funds, 171 N.W.2d 156 (Neb. 1969) (rejecting a challenge to the validity of a statute authorizing the sale of land held in trust for public schools), adhered to on reiz 'g,
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a proposaJ to repeaJ the supermajority requirement. 196 The proposaJ
was not adopted, and the supermajority requirement remains on the
books, where it has affected only one subsequent decision. 197
Only one other state considered a supermajority rule during the
Progressive era; Minnesota decided against such a requirement in
1914. 198 It is difficult to know whether the unpopularity of this approach stems from Ohio's unfortunate experience or from a general
appreciation for at least the principle of judicia] review, if not the
outcome of every case. It remains unclear whether such a requirement
offends any federal constitutionaJ provision. The only time since Bryant that the U.S. Supreme Court considered a supermajority rule came
in the 1979 case of Torres v. Puerto Rico, 199 which avoided passing
on the validity of a Puerto Rican constitutionaJ provision requiring an
absolute majority of the commonwealth's eight-member supreme
court to invalidate a statute. The case arose from a warrantless arrest
and search at the San Juan airport. By a four-to-three vote the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court ruled that the search was improper, but five
votes were required to overturn the local law under which the search
had occurred, so the law remained valid. 200 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, concluding that, regardless of the validity of the supermajority requirement, the search made in pursuance of the statute indeed
violated the Fourth Amendment. 201
This most recent development reminds us that supermajority requirements are more plausibly evaluated as a matter of wisdom or
policy than as matters of federaJ constitutional command. The unpopularity of supermajority provisions is reflected in the complete
absence of support for the idea not only at the state level but also at
the federal level. This is particularly noteworthy during a period of
narrow division on the U.S. Supreme Court on such contentious mat-

175 N.W.2d 63 (Neb.), cert. denied sub nom. Belker v. Bd. of Educ. Lands and Funds, 400 U.S.
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(1971).
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ters as abortion, affirmative action, and federalism. Ohio's experience
suggests that the advantages of such an approach are marginal at best.
Perhaps the requirement of more than a simple majority to invalidate
a law promotes greater judicial deference to legislatures. At the same
time, the Ohio approach demonstrates the serious problems that can
arise from poorly considered provisions. As John Marshall reminded
us, "it is a constitution we are expounding. " 202 Perhaps we should
hesitate to tinker with it too drastically.
Meanwhile, let us return to Dollree Mapp. We cannot say that her
case contributed significantly to the demise of the supermajority requirement. Still, hers was one of the last cases in which the requirement played any role. It affected only when and on what theory she
would be released. Without the requirement, the state supreme court
surely would have invalidated the obscenity law that she was charged
with violating. Instead, she had to await the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision applying the Exclusionary Rule to the states and finding the
search that led to her arrest to have been unlawful. Without the fruits
of that search, the authorities had no basis to prosecute her.

202

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (frrst emphasis added).

